Both sides, in their own words
Published 5 October 2026
Part C of the judgment records what counsel argued. What follows is the Court's own account of those submissions, not findings. Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
For the petitioners
Prashant Bhushan argued first. He said the scheme has no rational basis. Its stated aim, in an article by then Finance Minister Arun Jaitley, was more transparency in electoral funding because bond transactions pass through banks, but cash donations "are still permitted even after the introduction of the Electoral Bond Scheme". The Centre, he said, "ignored the objections which were raised by both the RBI and the ECI", and the non-disclosure provisions defeat the purpose of the disclosure rules already in the RPA and the Companies Act. Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
On Article 19(1)(a), Mr Bhushan said a voter has a right to information on "the affairs of the public and the government", relying on PUCL v. Union of India (2003), ADR v. Union of India (2002) and Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India (2019). The Tenth Schedule, he said, shows that parties have "decisive control over the formation of Government and voting by members of the Legislature". On Article 21, he argued that non-disclosure "promotes corruption and quid pro quo arrangements", relying on Kanwar Lal Gupta v. Amar Nath Chawla (1975). He told the Court that "More than ninety four percent of the total electoral bonds are purchased in denominations of rupees one crore. This indicates that bonds are purchased by corporates and not individuals", and that the confidentiality clause stops agencies such as the CBI and the Enforcement Directorate "from identifying corruption". He added that shareholders cannot see where company money goes, and that "The huge difference in the funds received by ruling parties in the States and Centre vitiates a level playing field". (The 94 percent figure here is counsel's submission.) Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
Kapil Sibal made fourteen points. He said unlimited corporate giving with no disclosure "skew[s] free and fair elections". He described the voter's freedom as having a negative sense (voting without interference or intimidation) and a positive sense (voting "on the basis of complete and relevant information", including who funds parties). He said the Union's plea for judicial restraint was misplaced, since the amendments concern the electoral process and not economic policy. Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
On the presumption of constitutionality, he argued, relying on Subash Chandra, that the presumption exists because the legislature represents the people and is validly constituted through free and fair elections, so "it would be paradoxical to accord a presumption of constitutionality to the very laws or rules that set the conditions under which the legislature comes into being". The Court rejected this. He also argued that corporate funding as such violates the Constitution because "corporate entities are not citizens and thus, are not entitled to rights under Article 19(1)(a)"; the Court did not go that far, and Justice Khanna noted that no one had argued corporate giving should be banned. Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
Mr Sibal said the scheme "severs the link between elections and representative democracy" because elected people lean towards donors and not voters. He distinguished direct quid pro quo (an express promise of policy) from indirect influence through access to policymakers. He also told the Court that the party at the Centre, from the data, "has received fifty seven percent of the total contributions made through electoral bonds". (Where sources differ: ADR's party-wise table gives the BJP 47.462 percent of bonds encashed between April 12, 2019 and February 15, 2024. The two figures cover different periods and use different measures; counsel's 57 percent is a submission and not a finding, and is cited here only as such.) Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
His remaining points were that one person, one vote is skewed because corporates get "a greater opportunity to influence political parties and electoral outcomes"; that Section 182(3) lets loss-making companies give; and that the right to information about funding is "a natural consequence" of ADR and PUCL, since the Symbols Order 1968 and the Tenth Schedule let parties shape legislation. On proportionality he said that even if the scheme curbs black money, non-disclosure is not the least restrictive means. On privacy he said donor privacy is not a legitimate aim at all: "The argument that it lies at the heart of privacy conflates speech with money. Secrecy of voting cannot be equated to political donations because while the former is an expression of political equality, the latter is contrary to political equality because it depends on the economic capacity of the contributor." Political funding is made "to influence public policy", so such acts are "public acts" open to scrutiny. Finally, he argued that the RBI Act amendment (Section 31) is bad because of excessive delegation, as it "does not set out the contours of the Scheme". Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
Shadan Farasat argued that the scheme does not curb black money. Black money and donor privacy, he said, are not Article 19(2) purposes, and even if they were the scheme is disproportionate: The regime still allows cash funding up to Rs 2,000, the scheme "increases anonymous funding through electoral bonds at the cost of contributions through regular banking channels", there is no rational nexus, less restrictive ways exist, and the "fifth prong" (sufficient safeguards against abuse, from Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat (2020) and Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. State of UP (2023)) is not met. Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
He called the changes manifestly arbitrary because corruption goes unidentified, there is "capture of democracy by wealthy interests", and one person one vote is infringed because "a selected few overpower the voice of the masses because of their economic wealth". Deleting the corporate cap was arbitrary in his view since it allows loss-making companies, removes shareholder control over the Board and permits unlimited giving. On shareholders' rights he invoked Article 25 (a shareholder whose conscience objects should be able to sell) and Article 19(1)(g) (a shareholder who sees political giving as unsound business should be able to exit). Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
Nizam Pasha argued that the scheme lets Indian-registered companies buy bonds "without considering their ownership and control", which cuts against foreign investment law treating companies owned or controlled by non-resident Indian citizens as foreign-owned or controlled. He called it non-transparent and in conflict with laws on verifying beneficial ownership and source of funds, and said the changes to Sections 29C and 182 "serve no purpose other than perpetuating illegal ends" and fail to achieve the stated aim of curbing cash donations. Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
Vijay Hansaria argued that the Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act 2003 aimed to push giving into banking channels, so the 2017 changes to Section 13A of the Income Tax Act and Section 29C of the RPA run against that and against Sections 80GGB and 80GGC. He said that since 1959, when companies were allowed to give, they had had to disclose the total and the party, and ceilings existed. (Where sources differ: The Court's own history dates company giving to the 1960 Act and a ban in 1969, so counsel's "1959" is cited as his.) He also pointed to the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Singapore as emphasizing "the importance of transparency, disclosure, and reporting in political contributions", showing "global consensus". Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
Sanjay R. Hegde argued that listed companies should not give without the consent of a majority, or three-fourths, of shareholders; that under Article 21 shareholders cannot choose whether to invest in a company that funds a party whose ideology they reject; and that under Article 14 Section 182(3) deepens the existing power imbalance between shareholders and Board, promoters and management. Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
P.B. Suresh argued that under Articles 14 and 15 the scheme falls hardest on regional parties and those of marginalised and backward sections, because "the representation of the backward classes is low in the corporate sector". He said the presumption of constitutionality does not apply with full force to electoral laws since sitting legislators "have a vested interest in shaping the laws that would make it easier for them to be re-elected", that removing the cap strengthens major parties and raises barriers for new ones, and that rival parties have a right to know each other's funding sources to critique them before the public. Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
For the Union of India
The Attorney General said parties are "an integral product of a free and open society" and are entitled to receive all support, including money. Bonds, he said, let anyone give through legitimate banking channels instead of cash, and confidentiality "ensures and promotes contribution of clean money". He argued that "Citizens do not have a general right to know regarding the funding of political parties", because the right to know was developed "for the specific purpose of enabling and furthering the voter's choice of electing candidates free from blemish", and that corporate influence on parties is for the legislature and not the Court. Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
The Solicitor General made twelve points. On disclosure, he said a public company declares the amount in its accounts without naming the party, and the party declares its total in its audited accounts, which "ensures a balance". Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
He said the legitimate interest was to move from cash to "a regulated, digital and legal political donation framework", with safeguards: Clause 3(3) (only registered parties with at least 1 percent of the votes at the last general election, which bars "ghost political parties"), Clause 4 (KYC), the 15-day validity (so the bond is not "a parallel currency"), Clause 7(4) (confidentiality of buyer information against the State except for a court or a criminal case) and Clause 11 (payment only by banking channels). The citizen's right to know, he said, must be balanced with privacy of political affiliation, since giving to one's party is "political self-expression", and anonymity of donation is "part of the concept of secret ballot". The right to information, he added, "only operates against information in the possession or in the knowledge of the state". Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
On the corporate cap he said that removing the 7.5 percent limit "was intended to disincentivize creation of shell companies". He asked for wide latitude on economic policy, since "the mere possibility that the law might be abused cannot be a ground" to strike a law, and said the fact that one party gets much more than others is not in itself a ground to strike the scheme. Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
How the Court dealt with these arguments
The Court accepted the voter's right to information argument, the point that trading is possible de facto, where it calls the bar on trading "not fool-proof", the Article 19(2) argument and the argument on unlimited corporate giving. It rejected the Union's plea on economic policy, Mr Sibal's argument that no presumption of constitutionality applies, the secret-ballot analogy and the claim that removing the cap deters shell companies. It did not decide the shareholder arguments of Mr Hegde and Mr Farasat, and it did not reach Mr Pasha's foreign-ownership point or Mr Suresh's argument on disparate impact. On the RBI Act amendment, this piece says only what the Court's own lists say: Justice Khanna lists it at para 79(iv), and the majority's operative para 216 lists the Scheme itself. Source: Judgment, ADR v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (Feb 15, 2024)
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