Gas, Diesel and a Hundred Million Barrels
Published 4 October 2026
Oil is the number everyone watches. Gas, diesel and the cost of insuring a hull are where the war reached ordinary bills. This chapter follows those three through the war and ends with the most recent policy move in the file, an emergency stock release agreed on 2 October.
Gas: Europe's benchmark and Qatar's trains
Argus reports that the Dutch front-month gas contract, the European benchmark known as TTF, closed on 27 February at EUR 31.51 per megawatt-hour. By 19 March, Reuters reported, the front-month contract touched an intraday high of EUR 74, the highest since January 2023, with prices roughly doubled since the war began. That is an intraday high, not a settlement. On 8 April, the morning after the ceasefire announcement, Argus reported the contract opening at EUR 42.90, almost 20 percent below the previous close, then trading around EUR 44. A half-month assessment of EUR 52.46 for 7 April is a different tenor and is not spliced into that series. The file does not hold a full February-to-October gas price history, and this chapter does not pretend to.
The supply side was a physical problem. QatarEnergy's chief executive and energy minister told Reuters on 19 March that attacks had damaged two of Qatar's 14 LNG trains and one of its two gas-to-liquids facilities, removing 12.8 million tonnes a year, about 17 percent of Qatar's LNG export capacity, for an estimated three to five years, and costing about $20 billion in revenue annually. The 17 percent is a share of Qatar's export capacity. It is not a share of world supply. Qatar had separately declared force majeure on all LNG output because of the wider shutdown, so the long-term loss of two trains is distinct from the temporary idling of the undamaged ones.
The recovery story was conditional at every step. On 16 June, one knowledgeable source told Reuters that undamaged Ras Laffan facilities could restart quickly and reach available capacity within a month if flows reopened. That is a readiness claim and not production. On 11 September, three industry sources said QatarEnergy was negotiating US LNG contracts through 2031 to replace lost volumes, seeking 2 to 3 million tonnes a year in one source's account, with force majeure notices reportedly extended to November. On 21 September, al-Kaabi said the company was producing very little LNG, that normal operations could resume within weeks of Hormuz reopening, that damaged trains would take around three years to repair, and that gas-to-liquids repairs should finish in the first quarter of 2027. Talks are not contracts, and forecasts are not repairs.
Insurance: a ledger, with tenors kept apart
War-risk insurance is quoted as a percentage of the ship's value, for a short period of cover, and the figures in this war were reported by different people for different things. They are given here with their attribution and are never blended.
- 6 March: around 1 to 1.5 percent of hull value in earlier examples from Reuters, with one example at 3 percent against 0.25 percent before the war.
- 25 June: hull war premiums falling from about 5 percent to about 2 percent after discounts following the June agreement, per Insurance Business relaying broker reporting from the Financial Times.
- 8 July: Reuters, citing anonymous insurance sources, had premiums heading towards 3 percent of hull value from 2 percent the week before, with one underwriter suggesting at least 5 percent. Some underwriters were advising owners to pause Hormuz voyages, though war cover had not stopped across the market. Typical war cover runs seven days and is reviewed every 24 to 48 hours.
- 9 September: an ENOC executive told Reuters that cargo insurance could reach 5 to 6 percent of cargo value, additional war risk up to 10 percent, and transit costs $10 million to $20 million. That is one executive's upper-end experience and not a standard rate, and cargo and hull percentages cannot be compared directly.
The commercial barrier was never only the premium. Crews and owners had their own views about the risk, and insurance availability was one factor among several.
2 October: the G7 and the hundred million
On 2 October the leaders of the G7 issued a statement on energy security and market stability. It commits them to a coordinated release through the International Energy Agency of 100 million barrels, beginning immediately and running over four months, including a substantial front-loaded diesel release in the first 20 days by G7 members and partners. The text gives no split between crude and diesel, no first-20-day quantity, no national allocations and no shipment schedule.
The wording is careful. It asks the agency to monitor full implementation of the commitments made in March, and then says that, taking into account commitments already fulfilled, the leaders will implement the new release. That is not the same as an additional 100 million on top of March's 400 million. Reports of a French proposal for 50 million barrels of diesel and 50 million of crude were negotiation stories and the final text does not verify that split. See Reuters and NBC for the reporting around it.
Two other commitments matter. The leaders agreed to coordinate refinery maintenance to avoid simultaneous shutdowns and, where possible, to raise utilisation. And they reaffirmed a commitment to refrain from energy export restrictions between G7 countries, calling on all producers to do the same. That pledge is explicitly between G7 members. It does not protect India or Latin American buyers, and a call to producers is not a producer's consent.
IEA members were to meet within days on further diesel releases if necessary, and an implementation report was due within 20 days. None of this verifies tank withdrawals, and it does not guarantee a cut in any pump price. What it does show is that, seven months in, the people managing the energy system were worrying about diesel.
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