The Blue Grid Files
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Ownership, consolidation and a mining belt

Published 13 October 2026

Molycorp, the company that was supposed to break China's grip, went bust in June 2015. On June 25, 2015, Molycorp, the Greenwood, Colorado-based rare earths miner, filed for Chapter 11 protection in Delaware, along with its North American subsidiaries, to restructure $1.7 billion of debt in its U.S. and Canadian operations. It arranged up to $225 million of new debtor-in-possession financing. Its petition listed assets and liabilities of more than $1 billion. Case number 15-11357. re028, Reuters, CORRECTED-Rare earths miner Molycorp files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy

Reuters' report of the filing is only a few paragraphs long. The lesson sits between the lines. Molycorp filed for Chapter 11 in 2015 to restructure $1.7 billion of debt, four years after the New York Times reported in 2011 that the market was rapidly coming back down. The report illustrates how falling prices complicated that attempt to build another source; it does not establish what every other buyer did. re028, Reuters, CORRECTED-Rare earths miner Molycorp files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy re021, New York Times, Prices of Rare Earth Metals Declining Sharply

Molycorp's story ended in a courtroom, but the mine did not. How the mine passed from a bankrupt owner to a new one is told in public documents that are short and specific. re029, Neo Performance Materials, Molycorp emerges from Chapter 11 as Neo Performance Materials re030, Mining.com, Mountain Pass sells for $20.5 million re031, Federal Register, In the matter of MP Mine Operations LLC: order approving direct transfers of control

On August 31, 2016, Molycorp announced that its confirmed Fourth Joint Amended Plan of Reorganization had become effective and that the company had emerged from Chapter 11 under a new name, Neo Performance Materials. The business that came out was a processing and manufacturing group with operations in 10 countries, including Japan, China, Thailand, Estonia and Canada, led by the prior management team, with an affiliate of Oaktree Capital Management as its largest shareholder. The announcement said that shares of the former Molycorp "are no longer available for trading on a public exchange" and that the previous common stock was cancelled "with no distribution to the holders." That is the public record of what happened to the former common stock. The auction described below shows that Mountain Pass was sold separately from the reorganized company. re029, Neo Performance Materials, Molycorp emerges from Chapter 11 as Neo Performance Materials re030, Mining.com, Mountain Pass sells for $20.5 million

The mine had its own sale. MINING.COM reported on June 16, 2017 that Mountain Pass went to auction on the Wednesday of that week and the new owner was MP Mine Operations LLC, "an American-led consortium, with Chinese rare earths miner Leshan Shenghe Rare Earth Co. holding a non-voting minority interest." Its winning bid was 20.5 million dollars, half a million above a competing consortium of ERP Strategic Minerals, the Swiss private equity firm Pala Investments and the Australian company Peak Resources, which also included two creditor groups from the Molycorp bankruptcy. The price was "significantly higher" than the 1.2 million dollar stalking-horse offer made in April, and the paper noted that the deal still faced scrutiny from regulators. re030, Mining.com, Mountain Pass sells for $20.5 million

The paper's account of why the mine was cheap is short. Molycorp had listed 1.7 billion dollars of debt when it went bankrupt, and through the bankruptcy was restructured and allowed to receive 130 million dollars of debt financing. It then placed Mountain Pass in care and maintenance, while continuing to serve customers from its production facilities in Estonia and China. In 2010 the company had "sensed an opportunity" in China's reduced exports, which caused prices to spike, but when China relaxed its export rules, prices fell, "leaving Molycorp to pay the bill for a $1.25 billion state-of-the-art processing facility." re030, Mining.com, Mountain Pass sells for $20.5 million

The sale also had to clear a nuclear regulator. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued an order approving the transfer of control of two export licences, XSOU8707 and XSOU8827, held by Molycorp Minerals LLC, to the new owner, according to a Federal Register notice of December 12, 2017. The order says MP Mine Operations bought the mine and processing facility "pursuant to an asset purchase agreement dated June 19, 2017," and that the licensee's name was being changed from Molycorp Minerals LLC to MP Mine Operations. re031, Federal Register, In the matter of MP Mine Operations LLC: order approving direct transfers of control

MP's own history page, which says that "in 2015, production was idled" and that "in 2017, MP Materials was founded to revive Mountain Pass," also records the origin of the site: in 1949 prospectors searching for uranium in the Clark Mountain Range found a geological anomaly and then bastnaesite, the Molybdenum Corporation of America acquired most of the claims, and by 1952 it had begun small-scale production of rare earths. It describes the deposit as sitting in a 1.4 billion-year-old carbonatite intrusion, averaging about 6.0 percent total rare earth oxides over the life of the mine, with about 1.9 million metric tons of rare earth oxides at a 2.4 percent cutoff. These are the company's own descriptions, and are given as such. re002, MP Materials, Company history

On Monday, May 20, 2019, Xinhua published a photograph and caption of President Xi Jinping, "also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission," learning about the production process of JL MAG Rare-Earth Co. Ltd. and the development of the rare earth industry in the city of Ganzhou in Jiangxi Province, during an inspection tour. The agency's caption said nothing about trade. The market read it as a message anyway. re033, Xinhua, Xi Jinping makes inspection tour in Jiangxi re035, Reuters, Rare earth firms' stocks soar on U.S.-China trade war speculation

Reuters reported on Tuesday, May 21 that shares in rare earth-related companies "soared," led by jumps in Chinese producers, after the visit sparked "speculation the sector could be the next front in the Sino-U.S. trade war." The MVIS Global Rare Earth/Strategic Minerals Index, which tracks 20 producers from 10 countries, jumped 6.4 percent, its biggest one-day gain since October 2011. Shares in JL MAG surged by the 10 percent daily limit on Monday and rose another 10 percent on Tuesday. re035, Reuters, Rare earth firms' stocks soar on U.S.-China trade war speculation

The background figures in the same story set the stakes. China accounted for 80 percent of the rare earths imported by the United States from 2014 to 2017. China's rare earth exports had so far been spared from U.S. tariffs, which the United States had decided not to impose on those and some other critical minerals, while Beijing had raised tariffs on imports of U.S. rare earth metal ores from 10 percent to 25 percent from June 1, "making it less economical to process the material in China." re035, Reuters, Rare earth firms' stocks soar on U.S.-China trade war speculation

The reporting separates the visit from any action. Ryan Castilloux, managing director of the consultancy Adamas Intelligence, was quoted as saying: "No question it's saber rattling." He added that he thought China would be reluctant to cut off supplies immediately, but that the visit's optics were a message about other countries' vulnerabilities. That quotation is an analyst's reading. Reuters reported analysts' view that the visit "might indicate China is considering using rare earths as a weapon." The report describes the visit and market speculation, not a new export restriction. re035, Reuters, Rare earth firms' stocks soar on U.S.-China trade war speculation

The next step was a stock market listing. Reuters reported on July 16, 2020 that MP would go public in a 1.47 billion dollar deal by merging with a blank-check company, Fortress Value Acquisition Corp, which was controlled by Japan's SoftBank Group. The hedge funds JHL Capital Group and QVT Financial would fold their ownership of MP into the vehicle. MP would net about 489 million dollars from the deal and a separate stock offering, and planned to use the funds to upgrade "outdated and mothballed Molycorp-era processing equipment" in California. The listing, Reuters said, would be the first for a U.S. rare earths company since Molycorp went public a decade before, and it came as President Donald Trump pushed to resume domestic production and processing, with China threatening to stop exports to the United States. MP had planned to process 5,000 tonnes per year of the two most common rare earth metals by the end of 2020, a goal now moved to 2022. re032, Reuters, U.S. rare earths miner MP Materials to go public in $1.47 billion deal

Read in sequence, the documents show a mine that was sold for 20.5 million dollars in 2017 and a company that was priced at 1.47 billion dollars three years later. The Reuters story attributes the new interest to Wall Street's rising attention to efforts to boost production of the strategic minerals, and to Washington's priority on reviving domestic production. It does not report any change in the deposit. re030, Mining.com, Mountain Pass sells for $20.5 million re032, Reuters, U.S. rare earths miner MP Materials to go public in $1.47 billion deal

Not every barrier to Western supply came from Beijing. Some came from ballot boxes. The Inuit Ataqatigiit party came to power in Greenland in April 2021 after campaigning to ban uranium mining and halt a large mining project near the southern town of Narsaq. The project, Kuannersuit, held one of the biggest rare earth deposits in the world, and was owned by the Australian company Greenland Minerals. It also held radioactive uranium. Greenland's parliament passed a law late on Tuesday, November 9, 2021, reported by Reuters the next morning, that banned uranium mining and ended development of the Kuannersuit mine, and banned exploration of deposits with a uranium concentration higher than 100 ppm, which the World Nuclear Association considers very low-grade. re037, Reuters, Greenland bans uranium mining, halting rare earths project

The lesson for investors was simple, and uncomfortable. A rare earth deposit's value depends on what else is in the rock, and on who votes. re037, Reuters, Greenland bans uranium mining, halting rare earths project

Consolidation, the project begun in Inner Mongolia in 2011, reached its next stage at the end of 2021. Reuters reported on December 23, 2021 that China had set up a new national rare earths company, China Rare Earth Group Co, under the state asset regulator following a merger of three rare earth producing entities. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) announced the company's establishment "but gave few details." The announcement on its own site, which carries only a short formal notice, said that with the State Council's approval the new group would be listed among the enterprises for which SASAC performs the investor's responsibilities. re034, Reuters, China sets up new state-owned rare earth group following merger re015, China Daily, Rare earth giant takes over 35 smaller miners re036, SASAC, Announcement on the China Rare Earth Group

State media CCTV, Reuters reported, said SASAC would hold 31.2 percent of the new entity, and China Minmetals Rare Earth, Chinalco Rare Earth and Metals, and Ganzhou Rare Earth Group would each hold 20.3 percent. After the merger China would have four state-run rare earth firms, down from what Reuters called the "Big Six." The CRU Group estimated, from first-half 2021 output quotas, that the new entity would be the country's second-largest producer and would account for around 70 percent of China's heavy rare earths output. Reuters described the consolidation as seen as "China's way of boosting its influence over pricing," in a country that it said controls 85 to 90 percent of the rare earths processing sector. re034, Reuters, China sets up new state-owned rare earth group following merger

The proportions in the two stories can be set next to each other, though they come from different counters. In 2019 Reuters wrote that China supplied 80 percent of U.S. rare earth imports in 2014 to 2017, and in 2021 it wrote that China had 85 to 90 percent of processing. The first measures what the United States bought, the second where processing happens worldwide, and neither can be added to the 97 percent of world supply quoted for 2009 and 2010. re035, Reuters, Rare earth firms' stocks soar on U.S.-China trade war speculation re034, Reuters, China sets up new state-owned rare earth group following merger re008, Japan Times, No improvement in China's rare earths ban re006, Reuters, China denies banning rare earths exports to Japan re007, Reuters, China lifts rare earth export ban to Japan: trader

In 2023 the U.S. Department of Defense began paying for processing capacity. The U.S. Department of Defense put public money into heavy rare earth separation, and the Australian company behind the Kuantan plant was one of the recipients. re051, Department of Defense, DoD Awards Key Contract for Domestic Heavy Rare Earth Separation Capability re022, BBC, Lynas learns fate for Malaysia rare earth refinery

The Pentagon's own announcement, published on the Department of Defense's businessdefense.gov site, said the Department awarded a multi-year contract to Lynas USA, LLC "to build an industrial-scale domestic separation and processing facility for Heavy Rare Earth Elements." The work was funded by the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment program, and the facility, to be built on the Gulf Coast of Texas, was described as a part of the department's "mine-to-magnet" strategy to deliver pathways through multiple vendors. The notice says the department had recently awarded MP Materials a multi-year contract to deliver a wholly domestic separation and processing capability, and described the awards as complementary. re051, Department of Defense, DoD Awards Key Contract for Domestic Heavy Rare Earth Separation Capability

On August 1, 2023, Reuters reported that Lynas had signed an updated contract with the Department of Defense for the heavy rare earths component of its Texas processing facility. The U.S. government's contribution currently allocated to the project was about 258 million dollars, "higher than the $120 million contribution announced last year," Lynas said, following detailed design work and cost updates. The Texas facility would serve both the Department and commercial customers and was targeted to be operational in the 2026 financial year, with feedstock from Mt Weld and the Kalgoorlie facility in Western Australia. Lynas, which Reuters described as the world's largest producer of rare earths outside China, saw its shares rise as much as 6.5 percent. re052, Reuters, Lynas Rare Earths signs updated contract with US government for Texas facility, shares rise

Not every move is a headline. On December 21, 2023, Reuters reported that China, the world's top processor of rare earths, had banned the export of technology to make rare earth magnets, adding it to a ban already in place on technology to extract and separate the critical materials. A correction on the Reuters story clarified that the ban on technology to extract and separate the critical materials was already in place. The list covered technology for samarium-cobalt, neodymium-iron-boron and cerium magnets, and production technology for rare earth metals. re038, Reuters, China bans export of rare earths processing tech over national security

That year China had introduced export permits for the chipmaking materials gallium and germanium in August, followed by similar requirements for several types of graphite since December 1. Nathan Picarsic, co-founder of the consultancy Horizon Advisory, called it "a clarion call that dependence on China in any part of the value chain is not sustainable." Don Swartz, chief executive of American Rare Earths, said: "This is now a race." re038, Reuters, China bans export of rare earths processing tech over national security

By 2024 Western governments were setting targets for capacity at home. The targets covered extraction, processing and recycling. The European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 on April 11, 2024, establishing a framework for secure and sustainable supplies of critical raw materials. Its recitals set out benchmarks for the Union's "strategic raw materials." The Union should "build up capacity to allow it to extract the raw materials needed to produce at least 10 % of the Union's consumption," should be able to "produce at least 40 % of its annual consumption" through processing, and should have recycling capacity "able to produce at least 25 % of the Union's annual consumption." A further recital says the aim is that by 2030 the Union "is not dependent on a single third country for more than 65 % of its supply of any strategic raw material." The text itself carries a qualifier on the first target: it says meeting the extraction benchmark "is dependent on" the availability of Union geological resources. Benchmarks are guides for the Commission and member states, and the recitals say the Commission should track progress and consider additional measures if progress is insufficient. They are not purchase orders. re054, EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 on critical raw materials

The legal text behind those targets is Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024, which establishes a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials. Its recitals say the framework should define the raw materials that are considered strategic and critical and strengthen the resilience of their supply chains in the Union, including by recognising certain projects as Strategic Projects. The list of strategic raw materials is meant to contain materials of high strategic importance for the functioning of the internal market, taking into account their use in strategic technologies underpinning the green and digital transitions or for defence or aerospace applications. The recitals add that, to take account of possible technological and economic changes, the list should be periodically reviewed and, if necessary, updated. The list of critical raw materials, in turn, should include all strategic raw materials as well as any other raw materials of high importance for the overall Union economy and for which there is a high risk of supply disruption likely to distort competition and fragment the internal market. First, the recitals say, the Union should increase the use of its own geological resources of strategic raw materials and build up capacity to extract the raw materials needed to produce at least 10 % of the Union's consumption of strategic raw materials. They note that extraction capacity is highly dependent on the availability of Union geological resources, so meeting that benchmark is dependent on such availability. Second, in order to build a full value chain and prevent bottlenecks at intermediate stages, the Union processing capacity should also be increased and the Union should be able to produce at least 40 % of its annual consumption of strategic raw materials. Third, Union recycling capacity should be able to produce at least 25 % of the Union's annual consumption of strategic raw materials, and the Union should be able to recycle significantly increasing amounts of each strategic raw material from waste. Those benchmarks refer to the 2030 time horizon, in alignment with the Union's climate and energy targets and the digital targets they underpin. The recitals add that efforts should be undertaken to ensure that, by 2030, the Union is not dependent on a single third country for more than 65 % of its supply of any strategic raw material, unprocessed and at any stage of processing. That language gives special consideration to countries with which the Union has established a strategic partnership, a free trade agreement or other forms of cooperation covering raw materials, as they provide greater assurances regarding supply risks. To ensure the benchmarks are met on time, the Commission, with the help of the Board, should track and report progress towards them. Strategic Projects should, according to the recitals, benefit from streamlined and predictable permitting procedures and support in gaining access to finance. re054, EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 on critical raw materials

Reuters reported on May 29, 2024 that the 2024 mining quota was estimated at 270,000 tonnes, according to Chen Zhanheng of the Association of China Rare Earth Industry, a rise of nearly 6% on the 255,000 tonnes of 2023, which itself had risen at a far faster rate. Quotas, Reuters noted, are issued typically twice a year, and 2023 had seen a rare issuance of three batches. The second 2024 batch, published on Tuesday, August 20, 2024 by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, set mining at 135,000 tonnes and smelting and separation at 127,000, bringing the 2024 mining total to 270,000 tonnes, up 5.9% on the 255,000 tonnes issued for the previous year, according to the trade site Rawmaterials.net. re040, Mining Weekly, China 2024 rare earths quota growth set to slow amid supply glut re039, Rawmaterials.net, China Issues Second Rare Earth Quotas for 2024 - Output Up 5.9%

The IEA's 2025 outlook later measured the 2024 baseline. Its rare-earth figures cover magnet rare earths only; the account here uses it as a retrospective measurement of that year, not a new event before the outlook was published. re045, IEA, Executive summary - Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025

On demand, the Agency wrote that demand for nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earths increased by 6-8% in 2024, driven largely by energy uses such as electric vehicles, battery storage, renewables and grid networks. A note to its chart says its rare earth figures cover magnet rare earths only, and that limit matters for every comparison with other counters. re045, IEA, Executive summary - Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025

On supply and price, it found that major supply increases, led by China, Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, "exerted downward pressure on prices, especially for battery metals," and that investment momentum weakened, with spending on critical mineral development rising by just 5 percent in 2024, down from 14 percent in 2023. "Today's low mineral prices are not providing the signal to invest," it wrote, and "projects involving new entrants have been most affected by the uncertainty." re045, IEA, Executive summary - Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025

The concentration finding is the one most relevant here. The Agency said that "diversification is the watchword for energy security, but the critical minerals world has moved in the opposite direction in recent years, particularly in refining and processing." Between 2020 and 2024, it wrote, the average market share of the top three refining nations of key energy minerals rose from around 82 percent to 86 percent, because "some 90% of supply growth came from the top single supplier alone: Indonesia for nickel and China for cobalt, graphite and rare earths." Mining was less concentrated: the top three mining countries' average share rose from 73 percent in 2020 to 77 percent in 2024, and most recent growth in mining output came from established producers, including China for graphite and rare earths. re045, IEA, Executive summary - Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025

The projections point the same way. The Agency said expected supplies of nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earths were "catching up with projected demand growth under today's policy settings, if planned projects proceed on schedule." But when the largest supplier and its demand are excluded, "for battery metals and rare earths, supplies outside the leading producer meet on average only half of the remaining demand in 2035." It added that even in a well-supplied market, such chains "can be highly vulnerable to supply shocks, be they from extreme weather, a technical failure or trade disruptions." re045, IEA, Executive summary - Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025

The outlook retrospectively lists the export-control sequence through early 2025. The Agency wrote: "Amid rising supply concentration, an expanding number of export control measures on critical minerals have been introduced, particularly since 2023. In December 2024, China restricted the export of gallium, germanium and antimony, key minerals for semiconductor production, to the United States. This was followed by further announcements in early 2025, including restrictions on tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, indium and molybdenum and on seven heavy rare earth elements." The Agency said that more than half of a broader group of energy-related minerals were subject to some form of export controls, and that the restrictions were "expanding in scope to cover not just raw and refined materials but also processing technologies, such as those for lithium and rare earth refining." re045, IEA, Executive summary - Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025

Two cautions apply. First, the percentages above are shares of refining or mining among the "key energy minerals" as an average, and they should not be read as the share of any single metal; the executive summary's rare earth figures are for magnet rare earths. Second, the Agency's picture of low prices and weak investment is an average across minerals and is not a finding about rare earth projects alone. re045, IEA, Executive summary - Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025

Myanmar's rare-earth story begins in October 2024 with a short Reuters wire report. Reuters reported on October 23, 2024 that an armed group fighting Myanmar's ruling military said it had taken control of a mining hub that is a major supplier of rare earth oxides to China, "likely disrupting shipments of elements used in clean energy and other technologies." Mining in Myanmar, it said, is concentrated in Kachin state around the towns of Panwa and Chipwe, next to China's Yunnan province. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) took control of Panwa on October 19, its spokesperson Colonel Naw Bu told Reuters, and had previously captured Chipwe, according to local Myanmar media. Reuters said it was not able to independently verify the status of both towns. Naw Bu said the KIA was focused on managing Panwa and had "no current plans for rare earths or other economic issues," and he did not answer when asked whether it was open to working with China on rare earths. re046, Reuters, Armed group says it takes control of Myanmar rare earth mining hub

The mines had been in different hands. The areas were previously under the control of the militia group NDA-K, which is allied with the junta and "welcomed payments from Chinese companies looking to establish mines," Reuters wrote. re046, Reuters, Armed group says it takes control of Myanmar rare earth mining hub

The scale came from a broker. According to Ord Minnett, cited by Reuters, Myanmar had supplied China the previous year with about 50,000 metric tons of rare earth oxides from ion-adsorption clays, "eclipsing China's domestic IAC mining quota of 19,000 tons and making it the world's top exporter of heavy REOs." That sentence is a broker's estimate, attributed by Reuters to Ord Minnett. The research firm Adamas Intelligence added that rebel control "could potentially disrupt rare earth concentrate shipments into China, which have declined for four months straight owing to the monsoon season and other challenges." re046, Reuters, Armed group says it takes control of Myanmar rare earth mining hub

China had already acted. According to Ord Minnett analyst Matthew Hope, quoted in the story, China halted rare earth imports from Myanmar the previous month and suspended exports of ammonium sulphate, used to leach rare earths there, because of the conflict. Hope said he expected the KIA to resume the business if China was prepared to accept the exports and supply technicians and ammonium sulphate, and that the KIA "will expect payments before letting the companies do so." He also said prices for the oxides used in magnets were likely to rise as supply tightened. re046, Reuters, Armed group says it takes control of Myanmar rare earth mining hub

Two things are visible in this early report: the scale of the supply and the uncertainty about who controlled it. The supply chain for heavy rare earths ran through a war zone, and the party that supplied the chemicals and bought the output was in Beijing, which could and did halt both flows. re046, Reuters, Armed group says it takes control of Myanmar rare earth mining hub

Money moved first in Australia. On December 6, 2024, Reuters reported that Australia would grant Iluka Resources an additional A$400 million loan for its Eneabba rare earths refinery in Western Australia, on top of a A$1.25 billion loan offered in 2022. The refinery, "set to be Australia's first fully integrated rare earths refinery," was now estimated at A$1.7 billion to A$1.8 billion, "a sharp jump from the previous estimate of A$1.2 billion." Iluka would put in A$214 million of extra cash equity beyond the A$200 million of cash equity and stockpile already earmarked. Iluka shares fell as much as 15 percent, and analysts at Sandstone Insights said the revised deal was "less favourable than ILU would have desired." The new money was subject to the company securing offtake deals and could be used only once the original A$1.45 billion funding was fully drawn, the company said. The several Australian dollar figures in that report describe different instruments, a loan, a further loan, equity and a stockpile, and are not added together here. re055, Reuters, Australia grants further $257 mln for Iluka's rare earths refinery amid cost blowout

China restricted exports of gallium, germanium and antimony between August 2023 and September 2024, Reuters later reported. In December 2024, it singled out the United States for an outright ban on the three, in response to new US curbs on China's chip sector. The three metals are used in products including semiconductors, fibre-optic cables, ammunition and flame retardants. re044, Reuters, China suspends ban on exports of gallium, germanium and antimony to the US re045, IEA, Executive summary - Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025