Eleven billion dollars and a communique
Published 8 October 2026
American arms sales to Taiwan rest on three layers of text that do not always agree: a 1982 communique, a 1979 statute and the congressional notification rules that govern each individual sale.
The communique of Tuesday, August 17, 1982 says the United States "does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan," that sales "will not exceed" recent levels in quality or quantity, and that it "intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution." In October 1981 China had demanded a fixed end date and Washington refused. The State Department historian records that talks began in January 1982, Vice President Bush went to Beijing in May, and by the end of July the Chinese dropped the "date certain" demand. Each side described the text differently. Reagan and later presidents read the pledge as conditioned on a military balance, and the United States calls the communique a political document, not law, while the Taiwan Relations Act is law.
The Six Assurances restate the American side. Per the text of Senate bill S. 3208, introduced November 19, 2025, which quotes Secretary Shultz's August 17, 1982 version, the United States has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales, has not agreed to consult the People's Republic on arms sales, will not mediate between Taipei and Beijing, has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act, has not altered its position on sovereignty, and will not pressure Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC. That is a congressional bill's findings, not the 1982 cable itself. The bill also quotes Assistant Secretary Holdridge's testimony of August 17 and 18, 1982, to the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees, that "we did not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales."
The Arms Export Control Act, 22 USC 2776, requires a numbered certification to the Speaker, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations chairman for a letter of offer at $50 million or more for articles or services, $200 million for design and construction, or $14 million for major defense equipment. Those are the thresholds in section 2776(b)(1). A license for a direct commercial sale at those levels cannot issue for 30 calendar days after Congress receives the certification, or 15 days for NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel and New Zealand, and not if Congress enacts a joint resolution of prohibition in that window. Taiwan is in the 30-day group by the statute's wording, because it is not in the exempt list. Section 2776(b) also provides a 30-calendar-day congressional review window for government-to-government sales to recipients outside the listed 15-day group. An emergency certification can waive that review, subject to the statute's justification requirements. The statutory thresholds explain why every notification in the list below carries a value.
The long record is mostly a Congressional Research Service account. On April 24, 2001 President George W. Bush approved for possible sale diesel-electric submarines, P-3 anti-submarine aircraft, four decommissioned Kidd-class destroyers and other items, the last of the annual US-Taiwan arms talks, with Aegis destroyers deferred. The Kuomintang-run legislature then blocked the special budget under the Democratic Progressive Party president, 2000 to 2008: the package for submarines, P-3C aircraft and PAC-3 missiles was cut from $18 billion in 2004 to $9 billion in 2005, submarines only, and not passed. On October 3, 2008 Bush notified Congress of six of eight pending programs, $6.5 billion combined. On January 29, 2010 came five programs totaling $6.4 billion, Black Hawk helicopters at $3.1 billion and PAC-3 at $2.81 billion among them, and on September 21, 2011 three programs for $5.9 billion, including the F-16A/B retrofit at $5.3 billion. CRS describes presidents bundling notifications on one day after suspected "freezes," and says the submarine design program approved in 2001 stayed pending.
Annual figures swing. The high year for US government agreements with Taiwan was fiscal 1993 at nearly $5.37 billion, and the low was $10 million in fiscal 2006. Fiscal 2001 shows $272 million, fiscal 2009 $3.17 billion and fiscal 2010 $1.25 billion, not adjusted for inflation. Deliveries run behind approvals: US government deliveries to Taiwan were $4.3 billion for 2004 to 2007 and $2.9 billion for 2008 to 2011 per CRS, which ranked Taiwan fourth among customers worldwide in the first period.
Later announcements show the scale of individual decisions without being mistaken for deliveries. In 2019 the United States approved an $8 billion sale of 66 F-16V fighters, but the first two arrived only in October 2026, according to the Japan Times. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency's December 2025 HIMARS notice, quoted in the package breakdown, records a proposed sale, not proof that Taiwan has received or fielded everything in it. Congressional notification, funding, contract production, shipment and operational use are different stages. A dollar value attached to the first cannot be used as a measure of the last.
In November Lai announced a US$40 billion supplementary defense budget for 2026 to 2033. On Wednesday, December 17, 2025, the United States announced an arms package of $11.1 billion, eight items, the largest ever for Taiwan also. The HIMARS portion alone was $4.05 billion for 82 launchers, 420 ATACMS missiles and 756 plus 447 rocket pods. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency's notice, Transmittal No. 26-01, covers the HIMARS part of the package: 82 M142 launchers, 420 M57 ATACMS, 756 M31A2 GMLRS-Unitary pods, 447 M30A2 GMLRS-Alternative Warhead pods, 39 HMMWV vehicles and 45 field artillery tactical data systems, for an estimated $4.05 billion. The buyer is not named as Taiwan but as the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, which is how Washington's unofficial relationship works on paper. Twelve days later came Justice Mission.