Where the oil money went
Published 6 October 2026
The EU's import dependence changed substantially but not uniformly. The Council's current energy page compares 2021 with 2025: Russia's share of EU gas imports fell from 45 percent to 13 percent, its share of oil imports from 27 percent to below 3 percent and coal from 50 percent to zero. Those are shares of EU imports by fuel, not shares of Russia's exports or of total European energy consumption. Nor is a zero coal-import share evidence that every Russian fossil-fuel route had disappeared. (Council, Ending Russian energy imports, 2021-2025 chart text)
A dated Commission release offers an earlier stage of the same transition. On 6 May 2025 it said the Russian gas-import share had fallen from 45 percent to 19 percent, while noting a rebound in 2024. The Council's later 13 percent figure concerns 2025. The May roadmap sought to end Russian gas imports by 2027 through stronger traceability, prevention of new contracts and cessation of spot contracts. Its announcement was a policy plan; later legislation and implementation dates need their own evidence. Keeping that distinction preserves both the scale of progress and the unfinished nature of the phaseout. European Commission, Roadmap to fully end EU dependency on Russian energy, 6 May 2025; Council, current 2021-2025 comparison.
The Council's current page gives different final dates for long-term LNG and pipeline-gas contracts: 1 January 2027 for LNG and 30 September 2027 for pipeline gas, with a possible 1 November pipeline date if storage targets for winter were not met. The page also recounts demand reduction, storage, renewable investment, faster permitting and joint purchasing following the May 2022 REPowerEU plan. The substitution programme therefore involved consumption and infrastructure as well as a legal ban. Its stated end date is an implementation horizon, not proof that every member state's exposure had already ended. (Council, Ending Russian energy imports, phaseout and background sections)
REPowerEU's financing architecture was also specific. The Council says recovery-plan chapters were mainly financed from remaining Recovery and Resilience Facility loans amounting to €225 billion, with up to €20 billion in grants from the Innovation Fund and sales of emissions-trading allowances. It describes the grant sources as 60 percent and 40 percent respectively. These are financing sources for the programme, not a single cash payment to Ukraine or a verified amount already spent exclusively on replacing Russian gas. The regulation enabling the chapters was formally adopted on 21 February 2023 after the December 2022 political agreement. This timeline allows the account to distinguish the May 2022 plan, the budgetary changes and the subsequent national investment process. (Council, REPowerEU plan:energy policy in EU countries' recovery and resilience plans)
The CREA analysis published on Thursday, 17 September 2026, estimated Russia's August fossil-fuel export revenue at €604 million per day. It reported an eight percent month-on-month revenue decline and a seven percent volume decline. These are research estimates of trade earnings, not Russian budget receipts or audited company profits. The distinction determines what can be inferred about war finance.
CREA reported a 13 percent decline in seaborne crude revenues and disruption at Novorossiysk. Loadings there fell 58 percent month on month, with a nine-day stop after attacks affected the Sheskharis terminal. That describes one important route. It does not establish that Russia lost 58 percent of all exports or refining capacity.
A methodological warning belongs with the numbers. CREA said its provider revises and verifies shipment data, and later monthly reports can update prior-month estimates. It does not amend every older report for consistency. The underlying baseline may have changed.
The report described a cap lowered to $44.10 a barrel on Sunday, 1 February 2026, and frozen under the EU's 21st package. The Council release confirmed a pause in automatic adjustment but did not state that numerical level. The combined account supports a discussion of policy direction, with CREA attribution for the number. Operational legal advice would require the applicable regulation and scope, not a research article alone. (EU Council)
CREA's August 2026 fossil-fuel analysis estimates Russia's export revenue at €604 million a day, down 8 percent month on month, with export volume down 7 percent. Crude export revenue was €350 million a day, down 9 percent, while the report distinguishes pipeline crude earnings rising 14 percent from seaborne crude earnings falling 13 percent. These are the research centre's estimates of gross export earnings, not Russian treasury receipts or net producer profits. The report measures several routes moving differently within the same month. (CREA, Luke Wickenden and Isaac Levi, August 2026:Monthly analysis of Russian fossil fuel exports and sanctions, September 2026)
The same CREA report estimates seaborne oil-product revenue from cargoes unloaded at destination ports at €78 million a day, down 32 percent month on month, with volumes down 21 percent. It says Tuapse loaded no oil-product cargo for the third consecutive month and that crude loadings at Novorossiysk fell 58 percent after attacks disrupted the Sheskharis terminal. It recorded nine consecutive days without Novorossiysk crude loadings, the longest disruption since the full-scale invasion. These are route- and product-specific observations; a fall in unloadings and a pause in loadings are not necessarily the same time-series measure. (CREA, August 2026 analysis, trends section)
CREA reported Russia importing 172,000 tonnes of fuel in August 2026, more than seven times its previous monthly high, including supplies from South Korea and fuel refined from Russian crude in India. The same analysis estimated LNG export revenue at €45 million a day and pipeline-gas revenue at €68 million, rising 18 percent and 25 percent respectively month on month. The coexistence of fuel imports with continuing fossil-fuel export earnings matters. A refining bottleneck can force a crude exporter to import particular finished products without making it a net importer of every hydrocarbon. (CREA, August 2026 analysis, key findings and revenue trends)
The shipping composition shows why service-linked sanctions face an enforcement problem. CREA estimated 52 percent of Russia's seaborne oil moved on sanctioned shadow tankers in August 2026,42 percent on G 7+owned or insured tankers and the remainder on unsanctioned shadow tankers. It identified 45 shadow vessels operating under false flags at the end of the month. These are the centre's classifications and observations, not a declaration that every G 7-linked shipment breached a cap or that every shadow tanker was legally identical. The figures support a discussion of the transport system sustaining exports and the distinction between listing a vessel, identifying its flag status and proving a particular transaction violated applicable law. (CREA, August 2026 analysis, shipping findings)
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