Missiles in the shipping lanes
Published 8 October 2026
The proximate cause of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis was a college reunion, but the National Defense University's account of it, written by Kristen Gunness and Phillip Saunders, says the visa was "the catalyst for the crisis, it was not the actual cause". The cause, they argue, was Beijing's view of Taiwan's democratization and what it called "pragmatic diplomacy" as movement toward independence, plus its loss of confidence that Washington would hold to its one-China policy.
Start with Lee Teng-hui. The first Taiwan-born president of the Republic of China was pursuing a campaign for more international space. He sought admission to the United Nations General Assembly, ran a "Go South" policy of golf and vacation diplomacy in Southeast Asia, offered aid to countries in Africa, Central America and the South Pacific in return for recognition, and began lobbying in 1994 for an invitation to speak at his alma mater, Cornell, and for a US visa. In January 1995 Jiang Zemin offered an eight-point proposal on reunification, calling for negotiations on an even footing. Lee answered in April with six points, saying the two sides were governed by "two sovereign entities" and asking Beijing to renounce force before talks could start. The NDU authors say the lack of serious consideration from Lee disappointed Jiang and may have weakened his domestic position, giving hardliners in Beijing more reason to press for a firm policy.
Washington made it worse. The State Department had told Beijing it would not grant Lee a visa. Secretary of State Warren Christopher had given that assurance, which embarrassed him when it was reversed. Near-unanimous but nonbinding congressional resolutions pushed the White House, and in May 1995 President Clinton decided to issue the visa. Lee spoke at Cornell in June. Despite State Department efforts to keep it unofficial, members of Congress greeted him and supporters waved Republic of China flags, and the speech repeatedly used the phrase "Republic of China on Taiwan". Beijing recalled its ambassador, Li Daoyu, on June 16, canceled visits by its defense minister, a state councilor and its air force commander, and cut off vice-ministerial contacts.
The military response came in stages, and the NDU account is more careful than the usual summary. On July 18, 1995, China announced a closure area 80 miles northeast of Taiwan for missile tests that the PLA code-named "Blue Whale 5." From July 21 to July 24 the PLA fired six DF-15 missiles with a range of 600 kilometers, with little warning. According to a declassified US intelligence report cited by the authors, the missile tests were chosen from "a series of options" and were not the most aggressive one the PLA offered. The PLA, they report, gave Jiang a frank view of what it could not do: a war would have "very high costs and a small chance of success" because of limited capabilities and likely US intervention. Phase one continued with the Shensheng-95 exercises off Fujian from August 15 to 25, with at least 59 naval ships and 192 air sorties. Phase two, aimed at Taiwan's legislative elections of December 2, 1995, included the "Success" exercises from October 31 to November 23, with a simulated amphibious landing on Dongshan Island involving two air force divisions, 300 navy vessels and 17,000 troops. The Kuomintang's vote share fell to 46 percent, the first time it had failed to win a popular majority, though it kept its majority in the Legislative Yuan.
Phase three was the one the world remembers. In January 1996 Jiang ordered the PLA to plan large exercises timed for Taiwan's first direct presidential election on March 23. On March 5 Beijing announced missile tests and exercises for March 8 to 25, which the PLA called "Strait 961." On March 8 it fired three DF-15 missiles into closure areas less than 50 miles from the ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung, with a fourth toward Kaohsiung on March 13. A joint amphibious exercise near Pingtan on Haitan Island ran from March 18 to 25, cut down by bad weather, with about 150,000 troops and 300 aircraft and ships marshaled, though not all took part. The United States sent two aircraft carrier battle groups in response, and the cover of the NDU study shows an F-14 launching from the USS Independence east of Taiwan on March 10, 1996. Lee won by a landslide with 54 percent. Peng Ming-min of the Democratic Progressive Party took 21 percent and Lin Yang-kang 15 percent. Many observers judged that China's vilification of Lee had strengthened him.
The standard lesson drawn in Washington was that a show of American naval power had worked. The standard lesson drawn in Beijing was different. China's military leaders concluded that they had no answer to two carrier groups, and they set about building one. That exchange matters to the military balance of the 2020s. A great deal of what the People's Liberation Army has built since 1996 was designed with a single scenario in view, and the scenario involves keeping outsiders away from the strait.
The 1996 vote was the end of a reform path, and the Congressional Research Service dates its steps. Chiang Ching-kuo began planning reform in 1985, after the 1984 killing in California of the writer Henry Liu, which the CRS report ties to Taiwan's Military Intelligence Bureau, describing the plot as "allegedly ordered". The Democratic Progressive Party formed on September 28, 1986, and martial law ended in July 1987. In 1991 the party wrote a "Republic of Taiwan" and a referendum into its platform, and the government did not crack down. In December 1992 the island elected a Legislative Yuan without the members who had held mainland seats since the 1940s. The first direct presidential election followed in March 1996. The CRS report puts the verdict in one sentence: "Taiwan's people did not fully enjoy democratic self-government until the first direct presidential election in 1996."
The visa decision did not come out of nowhere. Representative Tom Lantos introduced House Concurrent Resolution 53 on March 29, 1995, "expressing the sense of the Congress regarding a private visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States." The House agreed to it on Tuesday, May 2, 1995 by 396 to 0, and the Senate agreed on May 9 by 97 to 1. The vote records are in the Congressional Record. The resolutions were expressions of congressional opinion, not a law compelling the executive to issue the visa. Their near-unanimity nevertheless made the White House's reversal politically easier to understand.
Three years after the missiles, Lee Teng-hui reopened the argument himself. In a Deutsche Welle radio interview on Friday, July 9, 1999 he said that the 1991 constitutional amendments had designated cross-strait relations "as a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a renegade group, or between a central government and a local government." The same passage says "there is no need to declare independence" and that the resolution of cross-strait issues "hinges on the issue of different systems." Lee also cited the constitutional basis: the 1991 Additional Articles limit the Constitution's area to the Taiwan area, recognize the People's Republic's rule on the mainland, and require election of the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly from the Taiwan area. The text used here is the taiwandc.org copy of the interview. It comes from an advocacy archive, so the quote is attributed to the interview, not to the site.
Beijing also turned its position into law. On March 14, 2005, the National People's Congress adopted the Anti-Secession Law. The law has ten articles. Article 8 formalized the long-standing policy that China may use "non-peaceful means" if Taiwan secedes, if "major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China" occur, or if the possibility of peaceful unification is lost. China's law does not say when, and it does not name a date. The vagueness is deliberate and mirrors the American ambiguity from the other direction.
The text, as published by the Chinese government, repays a slow read. Article 2 says "There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China." Article 3 calls the Taiwan question "one that is left over from China's civil war of the late 1940s" and "China's internal affair, which subjects to no interference by any outside forces." Article 5 offers, after peaceful reunification, that "Taiwan may practice systems different from those on the mainland and enjoy a high degree of autonomy." Then comes Article 8 in full: "In the event that the 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity." The second paragraph gives the decision to the State Council and the Central Military Commission, who "shall promptly report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress". Three triggers, none with a measurable threshold. The third, that peaceful reunification possibilities be "completely exhausted," is the broadest, and only Beijing gets to say when it has happened. Article 9 promises to protect "the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals in Taiwan" and to "minimize losses" if force is used.
The decades after 2005 brought a political rhythm. When the Kuomintang held power, as under Ma Ying-jeou, relations warmed around a formula the party calls the 1992 Consensus. The phrase "1992 Consensus" was, as its inventor later conceded, coined after the fact. Su Chi, a former National Security Council secretary-general, came up with the term in 2000. The idea was that both sides agreed there was "one China" and could each interpret what that meant. Ma's approach treated the alleged understanding as a basis for dialogue, even though naming it in 2000 did not retroactively produce a joint document from 1992. The Democratic Progressive Party never accepted the formula.
The real story of 1992 is in the paperwork. The Straits Exchange Foundation in Taipei and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits in Beijing, both set up as nominally non-governmental bodies, held technical talks in Beijing in March 1992 on document authentication and lost registered mail, and Beijing insisted on a statement about "one China". They met again in Hong Kong from October 28 to 30, 1992, and could not agree on a formula. The foundation then suggested each side state its position orally, and on November 3 told Beijing "it is acceptable if the two sides orally state their own positions separately." Taipei pointed to a National Unification Council resolution of August 1, 1992 saying "both sides of the Strait insist on the principle of 'One China,' but the two sides have different views regarding its meaning." On November 16 the Beijing body wrote that it "fully respects and accepts" the suggestion and that its own oral statement would say both sides "insist on the principle of one China" while functional talks "do not involve the political meaning of one China". Legal scholars note that these fragmentary exchanges were later relied on by those who claimed a "consensus." The same article says Beijing denied any consensus on "respective interpretations" from 1995 to 1998. Beijing says the phrase embodies its own one-China principle, while the Kuomintang reads it as one China with different interpretations.
The follow-up came in Singapore. Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan, the two chairmen, held talks on April 27 and 28, 1993, the highest-level meeting between the two sides in 45 years, according to UPI at the time. They signed four agreements: on document authentication, on tracing lost registered mail and compensation, on liaison channels between the two bodies, and the joint agreement for the talks also. They did not agree on investment protection. "Taking the totality of what we achieved, I think we can say that this meeting was in the black, not in the red," said Cheyne Chiu, the Taipei delegation's secretary-general. Outside, a 12-member delegation of the Democratic Progressive Party protested the meeting. The Taipei side's own summary says the contacts began after November 2, 1987, when Taiwan allowed its people to visit relatives on the mainland. That date and the founding of a chip company in the same year are two sides of the same decade.
When the Democratic Progressive Party won the presidency in 2016, Beijing responded by cutting off high-level communication with Taipei, citing Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to endorse the principle of a single Chinese nation. The cut-off is still in place. It explains why, in April 2026, a meeting between the leader of the opposition Kuomintang and Xi Jinping was treated as the biggest cross-strait news of the year.